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Ironic language constitutes one type of utterancef or which the speaker'sl iteral and intendedmeanings are not the same. Humans are experts at indirectlycommunicating their attitudes and opinions in ways that help them to negotiatet he complexities of interpersonal relationships (Dews, Kaplan, &W inner,1 995; Harris&P exman, 2003) . In this respect,i ronic language is useful in the service of various conversational functions, such as criticizing, teasing, and joking. Although, there is ac onsiderable literature on adults' and children'su nderstanding of ironic language in laboratory settings ( seeC reusere, 1999) ,v eryf ew studies have examined ironic language during naturalistic conversations.I rony may be ap articularly difficult form of language for children to acquire, given that its intended meaning is not stated directly.The goal of this paper was to describe how ironic languageisused and understoodbyyoung children in family conversations in the home. Studying the development of ironic language may help illuminate onec ritical aspect of how children becomec ompetenta dult conversationalists.
Features of verbal irony
Non-literall anguage is ab roadt ermf or utterancesi nw hich the literal and intended meanings are not the same. Although, this describesm any formso fl anguage (such as metaphor,s imile, and indirect directives), in the case of ironic language,l iteral and intendedm eanings differ specifically in terms of their strength or valence.S ome commonly studied formso fi ronic language are sarcasm, hyperbole, understatement, and rhetorical questions (Gibbs, 2000) . Fors arcasm, the intended meaning is to some degree the opposite of the literal meaning, adifference in valence(e.g., saying 'Thanksa lot' to someone who let adoors lam in your face). In contrast, the literal and intended meanings of hyperbole and understatement differ in strengthb ut not valence. Compared to the intended meaning, the literal meaning of hyperbole is exaggerated (e.g., 'I have the biggest sandwich in the world') and the literal meaning of understatement is muted (e.g., 'I'm just at iny bit angrya ty ou right now'). Finally, rhetorical questions are those forw hich an explicitr esponse is not expected, or for which the intended responsediffers from that suggested by the question. The intended meanings of these questions typically imply an evaluative messagestronger than that of the surface meaning (e.g., 'How many times do Ih ave to tell yout os top?').
Usingironiclanguageentails ariskthatone's remark will be misunderstood (Pexman & Zvaigzne,2004) .Despite this risk, verbal ironyisusedbecause it canaccomplishvarious conversational goals. Theoristsh avea rguedt hatt he prototypical function of ironyi st o criticizeratherthancompliment (Sperber&Wilson, 1981) . Thus,irony maybeusedmost often, although note xclusively,i nc ontentious or conflictual interactions to indicate anger/irritation.H owever,K reuz,L ong, andC hurch( 1991)i dentified av arietyo fo ther conversational functionsofirony,including humor(e.g.,playing,being silly),and engaging in social hedging(e.g.,savingface, beingmodest).Indeed, therelativefrequency of these functionsdepends on thecontext in whichthe utteranceismade. Fore xample,irony is used forsocialhedging when thelistenerhas performedpoorlyand thespeaker wantsto mute anegativeevaluation, allowing thelistener to save face (Dews et al. ,1995) .Family members adoptp articularr oles duringi nteractionst hatc orrespondw ithv arying interactiongoals.Wheninteracting with theirchildren, mothersare more managerial and didactic than fathers, whereasf athers arem orep layful (Parke, 2 002) .T hus, ther elative frequencieso fi ronicl anguagei np articularc ontextsm ay vary in predictablew aysa sa function of parents' interactiong oals.T hati s, fathersm ay usei ronicl anguagei nm ore playfulwaysduringpositive interactions,whereas mothersmay useironiclanguageasan indirect disciplinary anddidacticstrategy.
Research on children'sunderstanding of ironic language Previous researcho nc hildren'su nderstanding of ironic languager eveals that it is a relatively late-developing skill. Laboratorys tudiess uggest that children do not demonstrate even an ascent understanding of ironic language until 6-10 years of age (e.g., Pexman &G lenwright, 2007) .T hisi sn ot surprising, given the complexity of reasoning required to differentiate literal and deceptive statements from irony.There are an umber of distinct inferences required to grasp the meaning and functiono fi ronic language (Ackerman, 1983; F ilippova &A stington, 2008; W inner &L eekam, 1991) . To illustrate this point, imagine that achild spilled her juice on the floor and continued to play withoutc leaning it up. Then, suppose her mother madet he sarcastic comment, 'Thanksalot forc leaning that up'. To understand this statement, the child would first need to detect the incongruity with the context(i.e., Ididn't actually clean up the juice). Next, she would need to infer why hermother is stating something untrue: Does mom believe Icleaned up the juice (a mistake)? If not, does she want me to be misled by her statement (a lie)? Or does she knowthat Iwon't believe her(sarcasm)?Ifshe is saying something untrue that she knows Iwon't believe, why is she doings uch athing?
Past researchh as assessed children'sa bility to makee ach of these distinctions by presenting them with hypothetical scenarios ending in non-literal statements. In one classic study, Demorest, Silberstein, Gardner,and Winner (1983) read stories to children that ended in various types of ironic statements. Children were then asked to indicate what the statement meant,and whythe speaker had made the statement. Only 8-yearolds correctly recognized the discrepancy betweenliteral and intended meanings, and it was not until after age10that children understood the communicative function of irony. Further, children'su nderstanding of sarcasm wasb ettert hanh yperbole and understatement (see also Winner et al.,1 987).D emorest et al. (1983) argued that sarcasm waseasier to understandbecause of the greater discrepancy betweenliteral and intendedmeanings. When children made errors, theymisinterpreted ironic statements equally often as mistakes and lies. However,the nature of errorsdiffered betweenirony types -c hildren more often interpreted understatement as literal, whereas they interpreted sarcastic utterances as lies. Hyperbolic statements were mistaken foreither mistakes or lies (Demorest et al.,1983; Winner et al.,1 987) .
In addition, Andrews,R osenblatt,M alkus, Gardner,a nd Winner( 1986) found that there was aclear shift in children'sability to differentiate sarcasm from mistakes and lies between first and third grade. Their results suggested two important conclusions about the developmental progression of children'su nderstanding of ironic comments. First, children initially recognized that as tatement wasi ncongruent with its conversational context before developing the ability to distinguish between mistakes, lies, and irony. Second, children understood intended meaning before theygrasped ironic intent (i.e., to be mean, to be nice; see also Filippova &A stington, 2008) . Understanding of the humour and teasing functions of irony appearstodevelop especially late, around 8-10 years (Pexman, Glenwright, Krol, &J ames, 2 005) .
Unfortunately,w ith the exception of af ew early studies,r esearchh as focused primarily on children'su nderstanding of sarcasm,a nd so less is knowna bout their understanding of other formso fi ronic language.A na dditional limitation of previous researchi st hat children'su nderstanding of ironic language has been tested almost exclusivelyu sing hypothetical scenariosi nal aboratoryt ask. Given that these stories lack the rich contextual supportofactual interactions, children may not performaswell as in more meaningfulcontexts with familiar partners. Chandler,Fritz, and Hala(1989) showed that children demonstratep recocious performance on false-belief tests when theythemselves are engaged in the task. Further, Dunn (1996) suggested that children reveal early 'understanding-in-action' foravariety of social-cognitive skills when theyare engagedi ni nteresting, emotionally-relevant interactions with familiar others (e.g., parents, siblings). Similarly,N elson (1986) argued that children'sa dvanced performance in naturalistic settings stemsn ot only from their unfamiliarity with laboratory tasks, but also from the fact that their knowledge is inherently connected to their everyday experiences. Indeed, Carpendale, and Lewis( 2004) have claimedt hat children come to understandlanguage via social interaction. Specifically,theypropose that the foundations forc hildren'sl ater explicit understanding of ironic language are formed during their early participation in conversations in which this language is used. In sum, all of these social constructivist argumentsimply that (a) early in life, children are exposed to ironic language in interpersonal interactions, (b) children'sability to use and respond to ironic language in naturalistic interactions will exceed their performance on laboratoryassessments,and (c) the understanding suggested by children'sresponses to ironic languagei ne arly conversations will mirror the patterns in children's later performance on more formal measures. Our study was an initial descriptive attempt to test these three assumptions.
Research on production of ironic language
Although there is alargebody of researchonchildren'sand adults' irony understanding, only af ew studies have examined the incidence of irony productionbyadults, and no quantitative studies have examined this question forchildren. Tannen (1984) found that during one conversation aroundt he dinner table, ag roup of 20-to 30-year-old friends used irony/humour in 7% of all conversational turns. However,t he author did not differentiate between ironic and nonironic humour in computing this proportion. Nevertheless, this incidence is corroborated by Gibbs (2000) ,who reported that college students used irony in 8% of conversational turns during talk with friends. Analyses included over sixty 10 min conversations recorded by students; sarcasm was most frequent,followed by hyperbole, then rhetorical questions,and finallyunderstatement. Using at ask specifically designedt oe licit irony in conversations between strangers, Hancock (2004) reported similar rates of ironic language use. Thus,a tl east in conversations betweena dults, verbal irony appearstoo ccur fairlyf requently.
Only af ew studies of parents' use of non-literal language with their children have been conducted to date. Sell, Kreuz, and Coppenrath (1997) observedparentsduring a half-hour laboratory free-play task with their children. Although, parentsused anumber of non-literals peech formsd uring thesei nteractions (e.g., indirect directives, metaphors), no utteranceswere coded as ironic. However,given the commonparental belief that ironic talk to children is harmful (Dyer-Seymour &C allanan,2 005), parents may have avoided using this type of language because theyw erec onsciouso fb eing recorded in the laboratory. In contrast, Recchia, Howe, and Alexander (2005) found that mothersdid use some ironic languagewith their preschool children in the home. Even these young children occasionally respondedt oi ronic utterances in ways that demonstrateda nu nderstanding of the discrepancy betweenl iteral and intended meanings and/or an understanding of the conversational function of the utterances. However,this study wasbased on less than 2hof observation foreach of 32 families. As such, this study did not includereliable estimates of the relative frequencies of particular types of ironic language in variouscontexts (e.g., conflict, positive interactions), nor did it include comparisons betweenm others' and fathers' ironic language.Q ualitative studies also provide suggestive evidence of children'searly production of certain forms of ironic language.V arga (2000) reported clear examples of hyperbole in preschoolers' language play with their peers, and Ely and McCabe (1994) noted instanceso fb oth hyperbole and sarcasm in kindergarten children'sclassroom interactions. However,no studies have systematically measured the frequencyofchildren'suse of differentf orms of ironic language in the family context.
The current study
This study was designed to address an umber of gaps in the existing literature. Al arge observational data set was employed to examinethe use of four types of ironic language (sarcasm, hyperbole, understatement, and rhetorical questions) by parentsa nd their 4-and 6-year-old children during interactionsinthe home. Further,children's responses to others'i ronic language werec odedf or their understanding of the implied meaning and conversational functions of verbali rony.B asedo nt he literature, the youngest children in this study would not be expected to pass formal laboratoryt ests of ironic language understanding. However,w es ought evidence of their early attempts to participate in ironic conversations,a nd of their early responses to this form of communication.Wealso examinedthe interaction contexts (i.e., positive interactionvs. conflict) of families' use of ironic language to investigate whether contextual differences in ironic language use varied between parentsand children, as well as between different types of irony.
Summaryo fh ypotheses
Theorys uggests that irony may be most frequently used to criticizer ather than compliment (Sperber &Wilson, 1981) ,therefore, overall, we expected ironic utterances to be used proportionately moreo ften in an egativet han ap ositive conversational context. However,c ompared to mothers,w ee xpected fatherst ou se more ironic language in playful, positive interactions, given the roles that theya dopt in family interactions (Parke, 2002) . With regards to developmental differences, we expected 6-year-olds to use irony moreo ften and fort heir responsest oi ndicate better understanding of the meanings and conversationalf unctions of ironic utterancest han their 4-year-old younger siblings. When children did makem istakesi nt heir understanding of others'i rony,w ee xpected the nature of their errorst or eflect the patternoferrorsrevealed in laboratoryassessments of older children (Demorest et al., 1983; Winner et al.,1 987) .S pecifically,w ee xpected sarcastic utterances to be misinterpreted as mistakes or lies, foru nderstatement and rhetorical questions to be interpreted literally,a nd forh yperbole to be interpreted sometimes literally and sometimes as mistakesorl ies.
Method
Participants Data were taken from the second time point of al ongitudinal study that included extensive observations of family interactions (Ross, Filyer,L ollis, Perlman, &M artin, 1994) .Fortyfamilies were recruited from amid-sized community in Ontario,Canada via birth announcements in the local newspaper.A tT ime 1, all families consisted of two parentsand two children. Before the second time point (2 years later), one participating family movedo ut of the region and two sets of parentsw ere separated or divorced. Thus, 39 families participated in the second wave of data collection, however,datawere only available for3 7f athers.
At Time 2, firstbornchildren'sagesranged from 5.42 to 7.00 years ð M ¼ 6 : 33 yearsÞ and secondbornc hildren'sa gesr anged from 3.83 to 4.75 years ð M ¼ 4 : 39 yearsÞ .T he sample included 21 same-gender (10 female and 11 male) and 18 mixed-gender dyads (9 older female and 9o lder male). Families' ethnic background (Caucasian), parental ages (25-50 years)and parental education(ranging from some high school to university degree) were representative of the sampled population.
Procedure
For 32 participating families, data werebased on six 90-min home observations at Time 2. Fiveofthe other participating families were observed7times in their homes, one was observed fivet imes,a nd one was observedt hree times. Thus,atotal of 352.5h of recorded home observations were included in this study.
For approximately half of the observations,both mothersand fatherswere present, while in the remaining sessions only mothersand the two childrenwere present.These two constellations of family members werec hosen because theyw ere thought to represent the two most common family contexts. For the two single-parent families, six mother-only observations were includedi na nalyses. To account ford ifferences in the numberofrecorded hoursofobservation between families, data were prorated by the number of sessions, and are presented as frequencies per 90 min session. It should be notedt hat data forf athersw ere based on ac onsistently smaller number of observationsthan reported estimates foro ther family members.
Observations of family interactions werer ecorded on audiotape and interactions involving bothchildren weretranscribed forlater coding.That is, parental speech was only transcribed during interactions with the children. Further,anobserverwas present during each session and provided ar unning accounto fa ll interactions between the children and any parental behaviours relevant to the children'si nteraction. Ad etailed verbala nd non-verbal coding system was used to categorize each interactional unit of family behavior (see Ross et al.,1994) .For example, verbal codesincluded Agree, Insult, Justify,etc. Forour purposes, these verbal interactional units were used to account for the total amount of talk by each familymember.Families were askedtoengageintheir normal routines and children werei nstructed not to interact with the observer. Major distractions such as television and video games were not allowed. Children had to be in the same room and parentsh ad to be near the children foro bservations to proceed, although absences of up to 2min were permissible in either case.
Coding

Ironic language coding
The first step in coding was to identify instances of ironic languageu se. Coders first identified each verbal line of the transcripts as either literal (i.e., the intended and literal meanings of the utterance are identical)o r non-literal (i.e., the intended and literal meanings of the utterance differ in some way). Inter-rater reliability of this initial identification of lines was established betweent wo raterso n3 0% of the data (70 sessions; k ¼ 0 : 68, M agreement ¼ 84%). These decisions were not always clearcut, as the non-literal nature of the utterance had to be inferred from the context. Contextual information was based on the family behaviour coding system described above. Importantly,the child'sresponse was not used to determine the non-literality of the preceding utterance. However,f or example, al iteral attempt to teach the child (e.g., 'Why should you stop hitting your brother?')could be potentially misclassified as a rhetorical question, also leading to difficulties forc oding children'sr esponses to this utterance.Assuch, coderstook aconservative approach in which aline was not coded as non-literal unless bothr atersa greed that al iteral interpretation was not possible. If there was any doubt that the speaker might be speakingl iterally (e.g., 'I want to use everysinglepiece of lego in the house') or engaginginpretense(e.g., 'Then Islept all day and all night'), the line was not coded.E ven after inter-rater reliability had been established, all non-literal judgments forw hich ac oderw as not entirely certain were resolved through discussion and consensus.
Following this initial step, each non-literal utterance was further categorized as hyperbole, understatement, sarcasm, rhetorical question, or jocularity.D efinitions and examples of each of these codes are presented in Table 1 . For the purpose of further analyses, the first four categories were considered to be formsofirony.The category of jocularity did not meetthe specific definition of ironic (in which the literal and intended meanings differi n strength or valence). Thist ype of non-literal utterance reflecteda more general tendency to play or tease using language,a nd thus was not included in analyses. Inter-rater reliability forc ategories of non-literal language was established on 30% of the data (
Each instance of the four types of ironic language wasf urther coded fors peaker (mother,father,older sibling, or younger sibling; k ¼ : 93; M agreement ¼ 92%), target of speech (any combination of family members; k ¼ : 91; M agreement ¼ 91%) and conversationalcontext(k ¼ : 92; M agreement ¼ 93%). Specifically,context was coded as positive (pretense, games,and otherconversation) or negative (conflict). These codes were drawn from the coding system used in the original study (see Ross et al.,1994 ).
Finally, each child's responses to others' ironic utterances werec oded. Responses could be made either verbally or nonverbally( examples of non-verbal responses included initiating or stopping ab ehaviour,l aughing, or whining). First, codersn oted whethert he child responded or didn ot respond to ap articular utterance ( k ¼ : 72; M agreement ¼ 86%). These judgments werem ade using counterfactual reasoning;i f the child would not have spoken/acted if the ironic utterance had not been made, the responsei nq uestion wasc oded.I no ther words, if the child'sr emark could be interpreted as following from an adjacent nonironic utterance by the speaker,itwas not coded as ar esponse. For the cases in which codersj udged that the child didr espond directly to an ironic utterance, codersassessed the extent to which the child understood the discrepancy between literal and intended meanings ( k ¼ : 62; M agreement ¼ 81%) and conversationalf unction ( k ¼ : 70; M agreement ¼ 85%) of the ironic statement or question.
Specifically,l iteral responses werec oded when the child'sr esponse appeared to follow directly from the surface meaning (as opposedt oi ntended meaning) of the statement, and theys howed no indication of understandingt he critical or humour conversationalf unction of the ironic remark. In contrast, the child was codeda s understanding discrepancy of meaning if their responsei ndicated awareness that the surface meaning of the statement was incongruent with the conversational context. Alone,t his code did not differentiate mistakes, lies, and irony (all of which constitute instances in which the speaker'smeaning is discrepant from the context). However,in combination with the discrepancy of meaning code, the conversationalf unction code did differentiate mistakes and lies from irony.Children were coded as understanding the conversationalf unction of the remark if theyr esponded to the perceived critical function (e.g., by protesting, defending themselves, or complying) or humour function (e.g., by laughing, responding playfully, or teasing) of the ironic remark. Thus, to demonstrate af ull understanding of irony,r esponses needed to indicate both an understanding of meaning and conversational function. Codesf or children'sresponses and examples are presented in Table 2 .
Results
For omnibus analyses, statistical significance wasa ssessed using two-tailed tests with alpha levels set at p ¼ : 05. The Bonferroni correctionwas used forall post hoc tests, and the Greenhouse-Geisser correction was applied when sphericity assumptions were violated in analyses of variance. The first set of analyses assessed the featuresofi ronic language use in family conversations and the second examined children'sd egree of understanding of irony.
Features of ironic language useinf amily conversations Overall, frequencies indicated that ironic language was used in all 39 families. More specifically,a ll older siblings made at least one ironic remark, as did 38 mothers, 26 fathers, and 37 younger siblings. In total, 1,661 ironic utterancesw ere included in analyses.
Preliminaryanalyses were conducted to examinechild gender effects on family use of ironic language.ANOVA sdid not reveal any unique or interactive effectsofchildren's gender on their own use of any of the four types of ironic language.Similarly,anANOVA examining parental use of irony (with parent,type of ironic language,and older/younger target as within-familyfactorsand each child'sgender as between-family factors) did not reveal that mothers' or fathers' use of any type of irony varied as af unction of their children'sg ender.A ss uch, to simplify subsequent analyses of families' production of ironic language,c hild gender effects were not consideredf urther.
Frequencies of ironic language in family conversations
First, we conducted analyses to examine,( a) overall rates/session of each family member's use of the four types of ironic language,(b) whether family membersdiffered in their relative use of the four types of language,and (c) whether differences in ironic language across positive and negative contexts were the same foreachfamily member. Specifically,weconducted a4 £ 4 £ 2within-family ANOVA with actor (father,mother, older sibling, and younger sibling),type of ironic language (hyperbole, understatement, sarcasm, and rhetorical questions), and context (positive and negative) as factors. This analysis revealed main effectso fa ctor, F Acomparison of the relative frequencies of the types of irony by each actor revealed distinct patterns fore ach actor (seeT able 3). Fathers usedr hetorical questions more often than sarcasm (all otherc ontrasts ns). Mothersu sed rhetorical questions more frequently than all other types. In turn, understatement and hyperbole wereu sed equally frequently.M othersu sed sarcasm less frequently than all the other types of ironic language. Oldera nd younger siblings both used hyperbole most frequently, followed by rhetorical questions. For boths iblings, sarcasm and understatement were used less frequently than hyperbole and rhetorical questions. However,o lder siblings employed sarcasm more frequently than understatement, whereas younger siblings used sarcasm and understatement equally infrequently. When familymembers' overall use of ironic language was examined in positive and negative contexts, motherss howed ad istinctive patternc ompared to other family members. Although fathersand both children usedironic language more frequently in positive than negative contexts, mothersu sed irony equally frequentlyi np ositive and negative contexts (see Table3) .
The types of ironic language used also varied by context. Hyperbole and sarcasm were used more frequently in positive than negative interaction contexts. Understatement also tended to be usedm ore frequentlyi np ositive contexts, although,t he effect waso nly marginally significant ð p , : 06Þ .I ncontrast, rhetorical questionswere used equally frequently in positive and negative contexts (see Table3) .
Proportions of ironic language use relative to totaltalk in positive and negativei nteractions
It is important to note that families engaged in verbali nteractions more frequently in positive than negative interaction contexts. On average, only 16% of families' utterances (i.e., verbal interactional units, as described above)o ccurred in negative interactions ð range ¼ 3-44% Þ .A ss uch, we were interested in further examining whether family membersu sed ironic language selectively in negative contexts, relative to their total amount of talk.T odoso, we proportionalized each familymember'suse of each type of ironic language in ap articular context by their total numbero fu tterances in that context.
With data proportionalizedinthismanner,a4(actor) £ 4(type) £ 2(context)ANOVA revealedm aine ffectso fa ctor, F ð 1 : 19; 36: 73Þ¼8 : 62, p , : 01, h Children'sr esponses to family members' ironic utterances The next set of analyses examinedhow childrenresponded to others' ironic utterances and what their responses revealed about their understanding of the discrepancy between the literal and intended meanings of ironic language, as well as the conversationalf unctions of these statements.B irth order and gender effectso n children'sr esponses were also investigated.
All younger siblings and 38/39older siblings respondedtoatleast one ironic remark; the data set included atotal of 747 responses. Each of the five possible responsetypes (i.e., failure to respond,l iteral, understanding discrepancy of meaning, understanding conversationalf unction, or understanding bothd iscrepancy and function) were computed as proportions of the number of times achild had an opportunity to respond to ap articular type of ironic language.( i.e., the number of ironic utterances to which theyw ere exposed).
In repeated measures ANOVA s, ac ase is excluded if data aren ot available in every cell. This meant that to conduct planned analyses simultaneously examining birth order, type of ironic language,a nd responset ype, each child in af amily had to have the opportunity to respond at least once to all of the four types of ironic language.T here were 22 families (i.e., 56% of the total sample) who met this requirement. This subsample included1 1s ame-gender pairs (7 male and 4f emale) and 11 mixed-gender pairs( 4o lder male and 7o lder female). The data from this subset of participants consisted of 234 responsesbythe older sibling and 262 responses by the younger sibling (i.e., 496 responses, 66% of the responsed ata set).
1 Am ixed-model ANOVA was conducted on this subsample with birth order,t ype of ironic language,a nd response( i.e., failure to respond, literal,u nderstandd iscrepancy, understand function, or understand discrepancy and function) as within-subjects factors,a nd each child's gender as between-subject factors.T he analysis revealed a significant main effect forr esponse, Table 4 . Children were more likely to respond literally to rhetorical questions than to understatement.I nt urn, children'sr esponses indicating an understanding of conversationalf unction were moref requent forh yperbole than fors arcasm or rhetorical questions.F inally, children'sr esponses indicating an understanding of both discrepancy of meaning and conversational function were more frequent forrhetorical questions than forhyperbole and understatement. All other pairwise comparisons were ns. Children'sr esponsesi ndicating an understanding of discrepancy of meaning alone (and their failure to respond to ironic language)d id not differb etween types of ironic language.
The analysis also revealed an interaction between birth order and response, F ð 2 : 32; 41: 72Þ¼3 : 33, p , : 05, h 2 ¼ : 16. Younger siblings ( M ¼ 0 : 75, SE ¼ 0 : 02)failed to respond to ironic statements more often than older siblings ( M ¼ 0 : 67, SE ¼ 0 : 03; p , .05). In contrast, older siblings ( M ¼ 0 : 09, SE ¼ 0 : 02)weremarginally more likely to respond with an understanding of both discrepancy and function than their younger counterparts ( M ¼ 0 : 05, SE ¼ 0 : 01; p , : 06). There weren oo ther significant effects, and gender did not moderate any of the above associations.
Discussion
This study is one of the first to describe quantitativelythe featuresofironic language in naturalistic familyc onversations, as well as the understanding revealed by children's 1 An examination of the mean proportions forc hildren'sr esponses in the complete data set revealed that the differences reported in this subsample were consistent with the pattern of means in the total sample.Assuch, children'sresponses in these 22 families appeared to be representative of the overallp attern in the sample of 39 families. responses to this language.The results suggest anumber of interesting patterns in irony use within families, as well as some developmental effectsi nc hildren'sp roduction of this language.F urther,c hildren exhibited differing levels of understanding of the meanings and conversational functions of the various formso fi rony,a nd children's understanding of ironic language varied as afunctionofbirth order.Eachofthese sets of associations will be discussed in turn.
Verbal irony in family conversations
Howand why do parents use ironic language with their children? Perhaps, unsurprisingly,our estimates reveal that verbal irony was proportionately less prevalent in adults' talk to young children than has been recordedp reviously in conversations between adult friends (Gibbs, 2000; Tannen, 1984) . Our irony coding was purposely conservative and certain formso fn on-literal speech (i.e., jocularity and teasing) werenot includedinour estimates.However,parentsmay also be less inclined to use this language in conversations with children than with adult friends. Mothers generally do not condone the use of irony with children because of negative perceptions of this language( Dyer-Seymour &C allanan,2 005). In addition, many 4-and 6-year-old children may not yetbecapable of understanding ironic language (see Creusere, 1999) , and thus parents may also avoid it fort his reason. Nevertheless, parentsc ertainly did use irony in some conversations with their children. When data were analyseda sf requencies, it wasc lear that children were exposed more frequently to hyperbole, understatement, and sarcasm in positive conversationalc ontexts than during conflict. However,w hen data were proportionalized by the total amount of speech in ag iven context, analysesr evealed that family membersw erep roportionately more likely to use understatementa nd rhetorical questions in aconflictual context. This context effect suggests that the four subtypes of ironic language may differ somewhat in their conversationalfunctions. Thatis, although, our results suggested that understatement and rhetorical questions may indeed be used selectively to serve critical as opposed to complimentary functions (Sperber &Wilson, 1981) ,o ur findings werel ess conclusive forh yperbole and sarcasm. Indeed, families frequently usedthese statements in their games and playful interactions, supporting the assertiont hati ronys erves conversational functions beyonds implyr ule/norm enforcement (Kreuz et al.,1991) .
Of the four types of ironic language,m othersu sed rhetorical questions most frequently and sarcasm least frequently.F urther,a lthough other family membersu sed ironic language more frequently in positive contexts, mothersused this language equally often in positive and conflictual contexts. Given mothers' typicalroles as teachers and managers (Parke, 2002) , rhetorical questions may be aless harsh and more didactic tool than is sarcasm. While sarcastic utterances tend to have an explicitv ictim (Kreuz & Glucksberg, 1989) , rhetorical questions do not necessarily attack the child directly but rather highlight the parental messageo rl esson more subtly.G rusec and Goodnow (1994)s uggest that indirect techniques such as humour or irony may be effective parenting tools, because theym ay promote greater internalization of values by (a) avoiding the anger and resentment that followsfrom direct confrontation and/or (b) by necessitating greater cognitiveeffortbythe child to construe the message. It remains to be seen whether these speculations will be corroborated by studies that more directly examine ironic languagea sadisciplinary or teaching tactic.
In contrast, the role of fathersi nf amily interactions has been describeda sm ore playful than that of mothers (Parke, 2002) . Fathersused ironic language moreoften than mothersinapositive conversational context. Thus,fathersmay have employed irony to tease or joke in addition to using this language to manage children'sb ehavior.A lso consistent with this interpretation, fathersu sed rhetorical questions,h yperbole, and understatement equally frequently,s uggesting that theyu sed non-literal language in more varied ways than mothers. Nevertheless, given that fathersw ereo bserved on fewer occasions and tended to interact less with their children than mothers, this initial patternoffi ndings should be interpreted cautiously.
Howand why do young childrenuse ironic language? Even the youngest children in our study occasionally used verbal irony in family conversations,which is in-line with priorworkthat employed smaller samples (Recchia et al., 2 005) as well as qualitative studies ( Ely &M cCabe, 1994; Varga, 2000) .S ocial constructivisttheorists have claimedthat this early participation in ironic conversations may be one means whereby children develop am ore refined understanding of the meaning and functions of this linguistic tool (Carpendale &Lewis, 2004) .Asexpected, the 6-year-old firstborns used irony more frequently than their 4-year-old younger siblings. This wastruewhether data were represented as frequencies or as proportions of children'st otal talk.W ew eren ot able to distinguish betweena ge and birth-order effects, thus, therea re various processes that could be contributing to this difference, such as developmental effects, characteristicso fc onversationalp artners, and complementaryr oles in family interaction. As such, it remains an open question whether, if tested at the samec hronological age, firstborno rs econdbornc hildren would be more proficient at using ironic language.
In contrast to their parents, children used hyperbole more than any of the other types of irony,f ollowed by rhetorical questions.Aqualitative study examining conversations in ag roup of preschoolerss uggested that hyperbole is used in young children'sl inguistic play competitivelyf or one-upmanship ( Varga, 2 000 ). An examination of the cases of hyperbole in our dataset suggests that this device was employed fors imilar purposes in sibling conversations (e.g., 'I have the biggest sandwich in the world!'). Children also appeared to use hyperbole to emphasize grievous injustices by their sibling and parents(seeexamplesinTable 1). One possibility is that young children'sexperiences with pretend play may facilitate their acquisition of this form of irony,a st heyb ecomee xperts at developing fantastical and exaggerated narratives (Lillard, 2002) .However,this is as yet an untested but interesting hypothesis.
It is also intriguing that children often used rhetorical questions,t he type of irony that was used most frequently by their parents. It is possible that children'sexposureto this languagei nf amily conversations may have promoted their ability to use these questions,a lthough,o ur data do not allow us to test causal relationships between parents' and children'su se of ironic language.F or instance, parentsm ay have used rhetorical questions more often because children'sown talk demonstratedtheir ability to understand this language form.I nc ontrast, understatement and sarcasm were employed infrequently by children. Understatement may be adifficultformofirony for children to master,asitisoften characterized by complexsentence constructions, the use of modifiers, and the difference between its literal and intended meanings is fairly subtle (see examples in Table 2 ). Yeti ti ss urprising that children useds arcasm less frequently than hyperbole. Past literature suggests that sarcasm may be easier to detect than otherforms of irony because of the greater divergence betweenliteral and intended meanings (Demorest et al., 1 983) ,a nd thus greater incongruity with conversational context. However,c hildren may have had fewer occasions to use sarcasm in their interactions. Fora ll familym embers, sarcasm wast he least-used form of irony, suggestingthat it may not be acommonlinguistic tool in family conversations. However, when sarcasm is employed, it may be as alient form of ironic language.A ss uch, there may be no direct link betweent he frequency of sarcasm in familyc onversation and children'su nderstanding of this linguistic device. We now turnt ot his issue,n amely, children'su nderstanding of differentf orms of ironic language.
What do children'sr esponses reveal about their understanding of ironic language? Certainly,i nferring children'su nderstandingo fothers' ironic utterances by examining their spontaneous responses is less precisethan asking them clearly defined questions in alaboratorysetting (e.g., Dunn, 2006) .When children do not respond, we cannotinfer why,and when theydorespond, their responses may not always reveal their true level of understanding. Yetthere is much to be gained from examining children'sunderstanding of irony in their real-life interactions. In particular,examining children'scontributions to conversations with familiar othersm ay provide insight into the early experiencest hat precede their later,m ore explicit, understanding of irony (Carpendale &L ewis, 2004; Dunn, 1996; Nelson, 1986) .
Notwithstanding the above, we found asmall birth-ordereffect, such that 6-year-old older siblings more often demonstratedafullu nderstanding of ironic language than 4-year-old younger siblings. Thus,a se xpected, our results suggest that the developmentale ffectso nc hildren'sc omprehension of ironic language observed in laboratory studies (e.g., Pexman &Glenwright, 2007) may also be revealed in children'snaturalistic responses to others' ironic language.This birth-order effect waspartly driven by the fact that younger siblings more often simplyfailed to respond to ironic language.However, this may indicate that younger siblings are unsure about how to respond,a nd is also consistent with ad evelopmental explanation.
Children'sr esponsest oo thers'i ronic remarks also suggested that their understanding of irony varied between types. Specifically,for hyperbole and understatement, children rarely demonstrated an understanding of the discrepancy between literal and intendedm eanings. Thus, responses indicating an understanding of conversational function alone were especially frequent fort hese types of ironic language.W hen children made errors, theym isinterpreted these utterances as literal.T hisi sn ot surprising, because the difference between literal and intended meanings forthese irony formsisone of strengthrather than valence, and as such is less extreme than forsarcasm and rhetorical questions.O ur results are consistent with laboratorys tudies of understatement, but not hyperbole (Demorest et al.,1983; Winner et al.,1987) . That is, when older childrenw ere tested using formal laboratorym easures, theyt ypically misinterpreted hyperbolic statements as mistakes or lies, rather than as literal errors. However,t he discrepancy betweenl iteral and intended meanings may be greater in laboratory studies because prototypicalexamples of hyperbole are chosen. In contrast, naturalistic uses of these formsofirony in our study mayexhibit greater variability in the discrepancy betweenliteral and intended meanings. Further,ascompared to sarcasm or rhetoricalq uestions, it wasd ifficultf or children to demonstrate verballya n understanding of discrepancy of meaning forh yperbole or understatement, precisely because of the more subtle difference between their literal and intended meanings. As such, this effect mayb ep artly methodological in nature.
In contrast,for sarcasmand rhetorical questions, children more oftendemonstrated a simultaneous understandingofbothdiscrepancy andfunction. When children didrespond to ironic language,29% of theirresponses to rhetorical questionsand 41%oftheir responses to sarcasmsuggested that they hadcorrectlyunderstoodthese utterances.Whenchildren didnot fullyunderstand rhetorical questions, they oftenresponded literally; however, this wasl esst ruef or sarcasm. Ourr esults arec onsistentw ithl aboratorys tudies of older children revealingabetter understandingo fs arcasmt hanh yperbole/understatement (Demorest et al. ,1983) .The literalmeaningsofthese statements,especially forsarcasm, were clearlydiscrepantwiththe conversationalcontextsinwhich they occurred, perhaps facilitating understanding. In sum, as expected,our data revealed that thesophisticationof 4-and6 -year-olds'r esponses to naturalistic ironic language surpassedp erformance on laboratory tests (Pexman &Glenwright, 2007) .
Notably,the low proportion of responses indicating an understanding of discrepancy of meaning alone suggested that, when children made errors, these errorswerel iteral rather than misinterpretations of irony as mistakes/lies. The differences betweenliteral and intended meanings in these conversational uses of irony may have been less extreme than the irony prototypes used in laboratorystudies,making literal errorsmore likely.Further,familymembers, especially parents, may be seen as crediblespeakers, in that theyare perceived as knowledgeable and honest conversation partners. However, with al arger database, it would be interesting to compare whether children's misinterpretationsofsiblings' and parents' ironic statements exhibit the same patterns, given that siblings often deceive each other (Wilson, Smith, &R oss, 2003) .
Limitations and futuredirections
Even with 9h of observation fore ach family, ironic language rates were relativelyl ow, and thus data on children'sr esponses were often based on small frequencies. Only a subset of our sample had sufficient data on which to conduct planneda nalyses of children'sresponses. Yet, only two younger siblings failed to produce an ironic remark and only one older sibling failed to respond at least once to af amilym ember'si ronic statement. Thus,our findings have advanced our knowledgeabout children'searly use of and responses to ironic language.I nf uture, using am ore intensive record of af ew children'sconversational interactions over time may be amore effective way to capture developmental changes in children'sirony understanding. Further,this study wasbased on an exclusivelyCaucasian Anglophone sample and is not generalizable to other ethnic or linguistic groups. It would be useful to determine whether family use of irony varies as afunction of cultural differences in attitudes towards this linguistic device as well as differences in conversational indirectness (Holtgraves, 1997) .
In our sample, therewas agreat dealofvariability across families in their use of ironic language.I fc hildren'su nderstanding of irony is fosteredb yt heir exposure to this language,t hen there should be predictablei ndividual differences betweenf amilies in children'suse and understandingasafunction of the frequencies of parents' and older siblings' use of irony.F urthermore, variables that predict children'ss ocial-cognitive understanding in general, such as internal state language,engagement in pretense, and conflict strategies, may also be associated with individual differences in children'sirony use and understanding. As such, these would all be fascinating avenues forf uture research. Finally, studiess hould combine observational and laboratorya ssessments to examine how children's experiences in the familyare associated with their performance on moref ormal tests.
